Old Money and New

CORPORATE CONFLICT AND GLOBALIZATION

The extent to which the world economy was monopolized in the late nineteenth century – the degree of globalization monopolized by Franco-British investment houses – is greatly understated in the historical literature (and in our general awareness). What was very distinct about the earlier period of globalization (and its form of colonialism) was the desire to ensure that all parts of the empire, as well as all nations that were not formally a part of the imperial system, were to function primarily as markets for metropolitain manufactures (and secondarily as a source of raw materials). As the twentieth century began there emerged three new industrial chalengers to this worldwide imperial system: Germany, the United States, and Japan. So long as the metropole held most of the world’s gold and investment capital, and the new industrial powers lacked their own colonies or protected spheres of influence, they did not constitute severe threats to the established world hegemony of Great Britain and post-Napoleanic France.

As in the United States, corporations in the other two nations were almost wholly controlled by what I would term ‘Old Money’ . . . that is, by finance capital from the global metropolis. Although new entrants could develop and grow to a point in each of the three newly industrialized countries, shauld they attempt to challenge the large established interests of the established combinations they found numerous impediments in their paths. For example, with regard to shipping, it was almost impossible to ship cargos in bottoms that were not owned by J.P. Morgan and the International Merchant Marine Corporation. Further, ‘Old Money’ controlled almost all domestic railways in these three emerging industrial nations. In these countries new sources of capital were required, as well as new areas that might function as protected markets and vital raw materials. The efforts of Germany to expand influence into Russia, the Balkins, Turkey and Africa (as Japan looked to Korea, Manchuria, and north-eastern Asia as a tributary zone), the United States looked to Cuba, Mexico, and Central America.

What began as an enquiry into the diplomatic history of The United States in Cuba and Mexico began to steer me into an exploration of the relations of North American business and government with regard to what appeared as inexplicable policy shifts (especially with respect to Cuba and Mexico..

Although much of this was expressed in my doctoral dissertation, I wrote a paper for a conference at the Australia National University intended as a part of the ceremonies surrounding the appointment of Luis Echeverría to the post af Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand. One of the Mexican historians at the conference asked if I would consider permiting the Historia Mexicana to publish it. Although it was published under the erroneous name ‘David’ Hoernel, it remains available on the Internet:

http://codex.colmex.mx:8991/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/YEKDTR7HLIEVFECP1IKQKFJT6PUNIV.pdf

The original copy in English is no longer available, however (since I sense institutional opposition to this theme), I am not inclined to translate it back into English,

I bring all of this up because it would appear that there exists a very similar situation at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century . . . however the sources of finance capital (as well as the ‘colonial’ role) are now very different. There are now two competing metro poles, and they are no longer so fixed upon the need to maintain industrial supremacy . . . it is now their role in finance and technology that is most zealously guarded. The so called ‘emerging economies’ produce far more than they consume, and (ironically) export mainly to those consumer nations that not long ago had sought to maintain their industrial advantage. The implications of this are serious (especially for Brazil, China, and India, however also for all nations).

If my point in all of this has to do with globalization, I suspect that what I would emphasize is simply that globalization is more than a worry for ‘crackpot’ historians and anarchists . . . it is a concern to all of us. Although I would like to think that what is implied may be similar to the Pepsi Cola ad that had the entire world holding hands and singing in happy harmony. Unfortionately however, I suspect that it has more to do with wealth, power, and the closed fist of authority.

Sorry!