Gender: Insight and Outlook

A COMPOSITION BY BOB HOERNEL

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Perhaps I should 'pitch' this to readers . . . you know, put a big hook at the start (and imply that the bait is impossible to resist). Well, I don't think so. There is an assumption amongst modern writers that the pool of perspective readers is shrinking, and that they must give readers what readers want: either a very compact body of useful information, or an entertaining escape from the mundane (in the form of entertainment). What I present here is not tailored to the tastes and interests of a shrinking reading public: I am not interested in entertaining my readers, and neither do I seek to educate or to seduce them. Here, I am attempting to share something . . . something that is not diminished as a function of sharing, parceling out, or giving away (as one might share a moment, or give an embrace without cost). As for the value of this that is shared in this composition, or in a comprehensive hug, that is for the reader to assess. Fear is a function of apprehension and conviction . . . it is as the effect of grasping or arresting, and trying that which is held in judgement. Comprehension has nothing to do with the trying of cases, or the weighing of evidence: to comprehend is to surround as with an embrace with twin arms. As with a composition, our capacity to comprehend enables us to avoid apprehension, fear, and bipolar extremes without the loss of our references or bearings, and depends upon our capacity to think in the twin modes of all dynamics: dynamic thought is cognitive and musical. Cognitive thought is general and generic, since the creative dynamic that is seen and felt is that of gender (and by this I do **not** mean sex).

I am not offering 'insider' information here: what is offered is a means by which to comprehend (that is, to see and feel the in-depth soundings of insiders, as well as the external and exclusive judgements and trials of outsiders). This is not complicated (repeatedly folded over), however it does depend upon a capacity to appreciate the insular core, and depreciate the definitive periphery (or *vice versa*). . . however, never to exclude either of the twins of perspective, perspiration and generative accretion. In brief: ***the potential to cognate as a person***. It should also be said that I am not at all sure (even at this juncture) that I might ever manage to share this that I have been attempting to reasonably clarify and put into words (for almost three decades now) . . . this 'bewareness,' as I have called it.

Honestly, I may very well be a fool for putting so much time and effort into attempting to share this that I both stumbled upon and thought out: I don't know, and I have no desire to know. What I felt was that (while the odds of success were extremely thin) it was within the range of my potential, and that it was not inappropriate for me to make the attempt. I was sufficiently beware to address my practical needs and obligations, and also to recognize that (if honest with myself) how I lived my life was at least as important as what I would have to say about life . . . and being. Also by way of introduction, I should say something about how this 'bewareness' settled upon me.

Whilst sailing solo in the 'Roaring Forties' of the Southern Ocean I had ample time for thinking. During the first half of a ten week passage from Wellington, New Zealand to Valparaiso, Chile I found that I did most of my thinking above decks (under the sun, moon, and stars). During the second half of that passage I did most of it below decks. When on deck my 'world' was lighter and far larger, whilst my thinking was more reasoned and more visually based: when below decks my 'world' shrunk and confined me in a space that offered little visual change, was usually quite dark or dimly lighted, however my senses of sound and smell were greatly increased (and, I should add, motion was no longer fixed against a reference with the horizon). I called these twin modes 'above deck' and 'below deck.' Those last five weeks were spent thinking mostly in the latter mode (although I found that I could move between modes as easily as passing through the companionway). The two were not opposed, and I found that the one served to complement the alternate.

Such thinking became my principle entertainment, however I had not as yet been confronted by the convergence -- the transcendence -- or with what I came to call 'bewareness.' We all have a sense of what it is to be aware, and what it is to beware. Much of this, and most of what we call phenomenological, has much to do with vision and reasonable phenomena. When we sense danger, we see signs of danger (and our conditioned response is to 'lookout,' and sharpen our awareness). Even when these signs are felt, smelt, or heard, our responses are largely visual. To beware is to use at least two of our senses: as there are two 'callers' aboard ship: the lookout (who scans visually, and 'keeps an eye out'), and the leadsman (who sounds the depths). When at sea, awareness is insufficient. Somewhat latter, but on the same voyage, I was in the inter-tropical convergence zone (the doldrums) and desperately trying to find my way safely into the Gulf of Panama; it was here that I experienced the most memorable night of my life (and heard the sound that all sailors dread most at night . . . the sound of breaking water). This was the night of my bewareness.

Although my hands may have gripped the tiller and combing somewhat more tightly, I swear I was not afraid (I recall thinking, 'Well, here it comes'). I have written of this elsewhere. There is no desire to imply some sort of revelation, as nothing was revealed; that I might have been transported to a landfall that was my destination by riding a tidal wave upon an otherwise still and flat sea would have to be highly unlikely . . . but not impossible. That ride (and all that both transpired and perspired that memorable night is unforgettable. The successful completion of my voyage from Melbourne to New York was at least as much a function of my good luck as it was of my skills as a navigator . . . and (I can tell you), luck is a lady.

And so you (the reader) have been inducted (or, perhaps you prefer, 'introduced). This composition is generous and general: it speaks as much to superstition as it does to reasoned knowledge or under-standing. Over and under (inside and out), there is no suggestion of a competition, trial or judgement between pensive or serious thought (or thinking the understanding) and what we might think of as superstitious insight (as seen from a station above): the trick, as in a trick at the wheel, has to do with getting the 'teeth' of one cog to fit with the spaces between the teeth of that which either drives, or is driven by, its mate. That, my friend, is cognition (or cognitive thought).

———————

INFORMATION AND INTERPRETATION

(Second Portion)

What I want to say, with regard to all that we experience in life, is that what we typically view as reality is but a drama. The question of what is real relates to the nature of a realm ___ to what is true with respect to this or another realm. José Ortega y Gasset characterized life as 'a necessary fiction' . . . and with reason; this is intimately associated with the oldest of philosophical debates. Although these sentences may be intelligible, they are written in a code; where we 'read' words, written or spoken, what is intelligible is not thought of as encoded. The mental hurdle needed to span the difference between understanding and comprehension is very difficult for us to jump because we fail to comprehend that all that we sense and interpret about our 'world' (our environs or our circumstance) is intelligible only as a function of a universal and intellectual code.

The code I refer to (the code of things) is formal, creative, intellectual and universal. What we interpret and process is information: information that we come to accept as the basis for all that we deem 'real' (as a function of how we value and interpret it). Ortega considered the intellect as the 'proto' thing (because the intellect serves to 'thingify' everything). In the same sense that these words are not thought to be encrypted or encoded, I suggest to you that every world that presents itself to our senses is both informational and interpretative: we interpret all that we sense through this universal code (that, when intelligible, does not appear to be a code).

What I would add to Plato's Theory of Ideas (of *Eidos* or of Forms, from which this exclusive dependence evolves), is, in essence, a 'bewareness' that what we think of as creation is also to be comprehended as a function of the same scheme of codification . . . that the creative impulse is, in effect, the declarative or formative aspect of rendering definition or distinction: the inverse aspect (that is interpretative) is an abstraction that is indefinite and lacks a standing or stance (is informative and formal). Ortega began with the things themselves: that is, with forms that possess at least a sub-stance (that, if not full of form, occupy space and possess what could be thought of as a stance). Here we begin with a creative application of **the** code of unification, of 'things,' and of all three of our formal systems. There is a problem associated with the theory of forms, as well as with the theory of universals.

Rather than addressing philosophical problems, I offer that this, and other, 'problems' are directly related to our consistent failure to comprehend, that <u>all that we sense and interpret is 'read' symbolically as information</u>: that is, all that we read of our 'worlds' (of form, and of our individual and collective interpretations of reality in

the formal mode) is not unlike whatever one may glean from reading a line of intelligible text.

That which I have been attempting to share throughout the last third of my life is extremely difficult to express through any or all of our formal systems (of language, logic, and mathematics): philosophers can but speak and write within the very code that they seek to address. This is the problem . . . the problem of names, laws, words and numbers (and it would appear insurmountable). Where Ortega maintained that life is a necessary fiction, he -- in effect -- was saying that what we imagine as a Truth, as either an identifiable truth or as Alethea (a hidden truth), cannot be isolated or known (in effect, that all is expressive, interpretative, and fictive). Ortega also lamented that we have lost the whole idea of what it is to be a person (and why persons are thought individual). This loss, I would offer, is a function of our modern lack of comprehension (and our failure to comprehend the difference between a Unitarian 'whole' and an integrity).

The 'problems' develop, in part, as a function of uncertain precedence: that is, whether integrity preceded a Unitarian whole, or *vice versa* They also develop as a result of our reading many nominal words (that once possessed clear and significant distinctions) as synonyms . . . that such words as unity and integrity, as location and position, or as exact, accurate and precise were confused as similarity gave way to equivalence. Some individuals, however, have managed to retain their comprehensive capacities (and continue to 'see' their lives as dynamic dramas, wherein each person has their personal role, story and song). These individuals comprehend that there is an essential difference between what is solitary and what is monist or singular *in a unitary and mathematical sense*. It is from this distinction that I depart in my final attempt at sharing this 'bewareness' that is impossible to *communicate*.

In essence, any integer possesses a bounding zone, whilst a unit is lacking all that might be thought of as a peripheral zone of differentiation (between such that is within and what is without). Units are not composed: they are monographs. Where boundaries are as mathematical lines (and possess a magnitude of length only), we are speaking of unitary things. The problems referenced above are closely associated with the problem of rationality in number theory. Pythagorean religion and thought is Unitarian, and exclusively so; the same may be said of scientific and modern thought (it is exclusively mathematical, and confuses units with integers). Where we value the prime portions or rations (of pi and phi) as endlessly irrational, we (like Pythagoras) are 'dealing' exclusively with monads and monographs; where we insist upon description and depiction, we omit the cod of the code (and, in quantification, all mathematical values are seen as fractions of either a particular particle, or of a universal collection of fractal things).

I cannot understate the pervasiveness of the indefinite conviction regarding the number one. One (the number one) may be thought of as one of any collection, or as the total quantity of things within any tote or cod. This one -- a Monist and Unitarian one -- is not equivalent to an integral one (or a composite creation, such as a

city that possesses a core and a bounding periphery, one that is bound by more than a line that possesses only a magnitude of length). Although few may agree, whenever we 'work' fractions, or find a mathematical reciprocal, we are treating the number one as the total or entire collection . . . as our unity. Allow me a demonstration.

If, when we add any two values we get a sum that is greater than either, and, if multiplication is truly as repeated additive operations, *why is the product of any two fractional values always less than either of those values*? With regard to measured grades or degrees, we always find the reciprocal representative of that portion needed to complete, or to fill, a series or a cycle: the proper reciprocal of 55% is 45%, and that of 90 degrees is two hundred seventy degrees (or three-quarters of a rotation); why then is the mathematical reciprocal of any value greater than one always a fractional value which, when multiplied by the value that is *its* reciprocal always either 1, .99999999, or .99999998 (n × reciprocal of n = 1 or .999 repeating, which is the same as one)?

The mathematical reciprocal must assume a finite total or a limited extent, and must be read as that value which is needed to complete its fullness. I suggest to you it is because (where the total is either unknown or infinite) we use the number one to express a unity (rather than one unit). A notation of an arithmetic reciprocal assumes that an arithmetic unit or measure is *not* a ration of an arithmetic whole (that is, that a unit is not measurable as a ration, share, or equal portion). It is assumed that a unit represents a specific measure of linear distance along an abstract and indefinite mathematical line, or a specific measure of actual or potential mass, of energy, of force, or of anything that is quantifiable. Numbers may be defined and definite, however all that is quantified must, of necessity, be counted and accounted in finite and invariable units. Even with respect to chronological time, as we define it in linear constants, our units are not so much relative to time as they are to tides and cycles. Nevertheless, reciprocation requires both a departure from nil or zero and an eventual exhaustion . . . that is, the notion of emptiness is the reciprocal of a notion of fullness (in the same manner that zero degrees is the directional equivalent of three hundred and sixty degrees). If a vessel is filled to capacity with a liquid, that same vessel is empty of whatever the liquid displaced.

In any closed system reciprocity is measured as potential, as measured in thermodynamics: in the context of relative fullness and emptiness (or ullage). Whether this is accepted or rejected is of little significance to me, however what is significant is what this indefinite characteristic of all units signifies with regard to rationality within an unlimited system (or realm) of time and/or of space. The Pythagorean brotherhood or religion consumed itself over the inability of its members to explain irrationality in numbers; it would seem that none could admit that a unit is not the same as a ration in limitless, indefinite or un-contained systems. By way of example, I offer the observation that when we consider 'one' as a unity, and equal fractions of that unity as fractal units, we must denominate the extent of each collection (that is, we 'un-name' the collection expressing unity, and rename the collec-

tion that we numerate). Where 'two' is renominated (as our denominator), we have a Unitarian whole divided in halves; where 'three' is renominated, our 'whole' collection is divided in thirds. The problem of irrationality is a function of 'odds' and 'evens,' as the initial unitary collection is equally divided into either an odd or into an even number of sub-divisions. There is a reason why we call them 'fractions' . . . they express fractured pieces of a Unitarian and indeterminate whole. The sum of all 'even' fractions (1/2 + 1/4 + 1/6 + 1/8 *ad infinitum*) is always one of the smallest 'pieces' less than one. This, in turn, is a function of our failure to comprehend quantification . . . and what exists as capital. What remains of gender in arithmetic numbers is reduced to a matter of odds and evens (and the odds are, our preference is 'play' them).

You might think of towers or columns composed of stacked disks or coins: the capital limits a quantitative series of units, and is not the same as those units that capitals limit (capital > lime, limbs, bounds). The capital atop a column bounds and binds groups of rational units as bundles. The bounded units are distinct from the binding capital: it serves to both set apart, and to segregate, a series of rations associated with some 'whole' collection. Each quantum is as a packet or pocket that contains quantifiable units, and the capital (or package) is counted as a cardinal point (historically, sealed with a crest). This enables us to count beyond three or four (and is the basis of numerical bases). Arithmetic numbers are as points of rotation, and, in the cardinal case, the base is four. There is also a difference between points and grades or degrees, however (as we have forgotten the basis of quantification) we fail to discern that difference. This is what we seek to remember and repair.

A degree includes the package, or the limiting boundary: if there are thirty-two points to a rotation, four of those points are cardinal or capital. Degrees are related to generational degrees of magnitude and plenitude (as well as to revolution, as distinct from rotation). Degrees are as steps or grades that are limited: they are integral, generational, and bounded or determined (whereas points and uncontainable units remain indeterminate). The *quantity* of points or units in an integral collection is always relative to three in base four, and the significance of pi speaks to the number of 'coins' or disks in a crowned or capitalized 'stack' of four (in base four). We confuse points with degrees, and treat degrees as if they were points.

> "Now I a fourfold vision see,
> And a fourfold vision is given me;
> 'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight,
> And threefold in soft Beulah's light
> And twofold always, may God us keep
> From single vision and Newton's sleep."
>
> William Blake

What this implies (to me, at least) is that civil persons, people, have long tended to think the understanding, to the exclusion of all perspective. From our monist and monetary point of view, we

look up upon a clear night sky and consider all relative to points of light and the negative space upon which they are located . . . our thought is exclusively considerate (literally sidereal, relative to the stars). I say 'exclusive' since the considerate scheme is equivalent to an 'is' / 'is not' argument . . . all that is, is differentiated from what is not. We consider stars things, whilst we dismiss the screen or pane upon which they appear (as nothing). Negation, in considerate schemes, is equivalent to extinguishing a previously distinguished star. In finite schemes, however, negation reduces a limited collection such that an omission or negation renders the collection incomplete, deficient or 'owing.' I ask you; are you (or should we be) content to exist in considerate worlds of opposites and balances? Are our existential worlds conceived and perceived as they are (existentially) as a function of our senses, of what we find about us, or as a function of our exclusive mode of taxonomic differentiation (and the convictions that we accept as proof and truth)?

This question is not rhetorical; in a genuine sense, the question is fundamental and theatrical. Yes; these serious worlds of grams and grammar are entertaining (and all such drams and dramatics must ultimately be seen as hilariously comical, or as crushingly tragic . . . in one of two opposed extremes (each of which negates the other). To be conscious means to be aware in the sense of living with knowledge. For my own part, I neither wish nor desire to know . . . and am quite content to simply be familiar (and to play within the dynamic units of my days and years, as well as in the nights -- *and in the twilight moments* of every integral cycle). Be that as it may, we need a sense of destination (in each of our journeys, and each of our voyages); the objective of today's journey is to share this comprehensive 'bewareness,' and the code of civil abundance.

We embark upon this journey with a set of twins, one of which is the complement of the other: with a person, a soul, or a desiccate son and a full-bodied son. If you wish to keep your considerate or stellar references, think of Gemini (or of the Dioscuri). This dynamic Duo is solitary and individual (and, you might try thinking of them as complements rather than opposites, as dusk completes a day and renders each discrete from night, or as dawn heralds the day, and renders each night discrete). Each (day or night) is not opposed to the other; rather, each is the complement of the other . . . and Castor is the complement of Pollux. Every person born of a mother is as individual as are the twins of dynamic, or the twin stars of the Dioscuri. Contrary to popular opinion, pirates avoided use of the word, 'are;' if they used the word (and emphasized the 'rrrrr'), they used 'are' only when mocking civil usage . . . they preferred using 'be' instead. Where I have written and spoken of sharing my 'bewareness,' I imply something quite similar. This also speaks to what I have been saying with regard to comprehension and my preference for a dyadic approach over a monist (and the difference between to gin and to begin).

If there is a means by which to begin improving our comprehensive capacity (and diminishing our exclusive dependance upon knowledgeable conviction), I would begin by observing that every son born of a mother (a son is an offspring of either sex) is born as a dynamic dyad: there is the dessicated son; and there is the son that is full of form (and the person is joined as a solitary 'one' in a tandem relationship of shared confluence and influence). As in the Myth of Dioscuri, the placental and dessicated son does not live past birth (and may be thought 'slain' or sacrificed), whilst the more able-bodied son, although mortal, will live on, *both sons*

continue to share a confluent and influential relationship, and a 'bewareness,' throughout the term of a natural life. With respect to beginnings, as with any discussion of conviction and reasoned knowledge, we need not enter into rhetorical and historical argumentation so as to try, convince, and pronounce in favor of one or the other opposed cases (before dispensing with one of the two, as well as the case) . . . this, because we are no longer exclusively concerned with 'things' as such.

In order to share such that I intend to enable, we must make use of language, logic and number. With this in mind, there is a need to restore a sense of *mythos*. The dynamic of language also requires a fluent sharing between the twin names and laws (*nomos*) that all words once enjoyed: a correspondence between the *logos* of every solitary word and a more spiritual *mythos*. Comprehend that I am not interested in proving this, and that I do not seek to convince anyone. As with the compositions we associate with painters and poets, composition and perspective depend upon both aspects of the creative (and musical) dynamic (and to set one in conflict with the other would be counter-productive).

_____

REPARATION

(Third Portion)

What the title of this chapter is intended to indicate is a need to begin: to begin remembering the integrity of the dynamic, and of our personal selves. Religion speaks to relegation, whereas reparation addresses the need to repair (the creative dynamic). My dissatisfaction with religion (and all religion is formal and organized) is the manner in which civil religion envisions our monad, dyad and triad. The ecclesia expresses an exclusive gathering that relates to both city-states and to the citizens of that state: it is as a mother hen calling out to her chicks (as a call to assemble before her). Civil 'families' are ordered in ranks and files, and classified with regard for a taxonomic placement within or without such a category. Taxonomy relates more to words and the cataloging of words with regard to some or another specific character or quality (which is why and how they are ordered). In the formal system of language, we impose such a system of determination (based upon some or another set of differentiating categorical characters or traits) . . . a system of both inclusion and exclusion. This is our nominal system of things, as well as of words, of logic, and of numbers: either something fits the category or does not. The ranking goes from bottom to top (in a vertical ascendance). I emphasize: religion is civil and civic . . . before civilization, there was no religion. **There was, however, comprehensive belief.**

I have repeatedly stated and written that I believe in God, and yet have been unable to declare that I profess a religion. My 'problem' with religion is that all are monist, Unitarian, and based in civil constructs. Perhaps some may disagree with this statement, however, if a faith does not seek to rebind, it would not be included in the category named for the reestablishment of its bindings. Here I must attempt to clarify. Religion is intimately tied to the idea of *nomos* (of law and name), and to reading (*legare*); *ligare,* signifies to tie together, but also to choose or select.

Like language, religion is also interpretative (and, as we read symbolic information, we are constantly culling, selecting, and rejecting). The civil goal of religion is (consistently) aimed at re-establishing (and regulating) the binding laws of an ideal ancient city or golden age. Cities and states have sought to use religion (especially to strengthen their power and that of their legions). Although the three civil estates often contended for advantage, they shared a common purpose. It is, I would observe, more than a bit ironic that religion should be relegated to a position of civil and commercial redundancy.

There is, I submit, no need to dispense with, or to defeat, the view that we would call Monist and Unitarian, as I do not accept that there is a need for exclusivity or conviction . . . after all, the destination I seek is a comprehension (which is why this effort is created as a composition). What I seek to avoid is complication and divisive competition . . . I do not dispute the existence of a realm, and nor do I dismiss the Unitarian aspect of either reality or of the code. You might think I consider monist and Unitarian precepts incompatible with those we identify as dynamic, integral, and comprehensive: I do not.

What I lament is the apparent tendency of Unitarian ideas and knowledge to exclude the bounding and essential periphery; in doing so, it destroys dynamic being (and forecloses our capacity to comprehend). Consequently, we lose the sense of what it means to be a person (as distinct from a citizen, or people). The same may be said of the significance of perspective. The introductory portion of this composition attempted to clarify why it is that (in essence) our exclusively Monist visions foreclose our potential for comprehension.

We (people) appear convinced that 'truth' and 'fact' is monist, as, no matter what the outcome of trial, both the case for innocence and the case for guilt are disposed of (as that which is tried by trial, the case, is rendered as one or the other) because it is thought resolved and settled. So also is the 'packaging' of every 'present' disposed of (and even the twilight hours of every day). As with the most famous of packaged presents (that presented to Pandora), once the package is opened, the gift is lost; the present is lost not as a function of opening the gift . . . but because the gift *was* the integrity of the contents and the container. So much of our failure to comprehend is made comprehensible when we realize the distinction between a monist 'one' and an integral or solitary 'one' . . . once the 'twins' are repaired (the placental one that contained, and the one that was contained) we may begin, truly be, and comprehend.

Quantification has been exclusively monist and unitary at least since the influence of Pythagorean ideas (and their effect upon civil systems and structures). People, the word, references both a unified citizenry and a unitary citizen: this is related to quantification, and to the practice of counting citizens, or any other sort of units, through the use of symbolic pebbles (as was done in Pythagorean numerical representations and computations). This is not to say that people did not quantify before Pythagoras: counting beyond a limit of three or four is as old as civilization, however, as cities grew in complexity and developed systems of exchange and accounting, so also did monetary or monist visions (and quantification) grow (whilst integral relationships withered away). Pythagorean thought served to render integral and comprehensive ideas obsolete. People were counted as stones or pebbles are, and all *people* were citizens; *persons*, however, who were not also citizens, were not included in that privileged minority. Monism (and the idea of the kind of singularity that we associate with the prefix *mono*) does not apply to all that is solitary or singular, and predates Pythagoras. Along with the idea of a monad, there was that of a dyad. Diogenes lamented that Pythagoras effectively 'itified' the es-

of a dyad. Diogenes lamented that Pythagoras effectively 'itified' the essential dyad . . . and in its place we got but points, planes, lines and multiple dimensions; in a sense, the same may be said with regard to the integral and essential person. The binary is/is not mode of trial is syllogistic and exclusive; further, it serves to disfigure our comprehension of logic, law, and even of the realm. The *logos* once spoke to a rational and proportional apportionment . . . an integral apportionment.

Were we to count in base four, we would count first-base, second-base, and third only: as in baseball, the 'bag' from which we depart and return is the base that is not a base (but that for which the base in which we count is named). In quantification, what we do is count degrees as if they were points: three-hundred sixty degrees is the same point as zero degrees (and as home plate), so we never count either the 'bag' from which we depart, or that to which we arrive . . . and when we measure (in units), what we do is dismiss the magnitude, or the stance, of every 'cod,' poke, or bag, as well as that of every moving body. We measure spaces in units of *distant* relativity, and we measure time in *instant* points of relativity: hence, what we think of as units of velocity expresses an instant *relativity* that is (as Zeno pointed out) entirely abstracted and theoretical. There is a very real difference between considerate and distant points that lack magnitude, and actual particles (bodies, or vessels) that possess a stance and a standing (and, as Ortega lectured, between an actual peso and a potential peso).

What I want to get across is the idea of a person as a vessel or ship; persons are more navicular than particular; persons are as integers, and when a person acts as an integrity he or she acts in concert with that aspect of self that possesses a soul. In brief, a person is as the cod of the code . . . is navicular in form (in the sense of **being** composed of hold and hull, core and boundary, or nut and shell). Unitary and universal systems are symbolic representations that express relativity (rather than relationships) within a schematic code: in codified expression (and in all that is noted as knowledge), and what we get is sets of opposed notions that are particular and partial relativities that can but *reflect* a realm and its reality. That is, we get some virtual 'thing' (as the containing bounds of the realm, or of any integrity, are removed and dispensed with). What makes universal visions so exclusive is our failure to comprehend quantification, and the pervasiveness of our instant and distant assumptions regarding numerical units.

In Greek history, the culture of Athens and Tyre developed in accord with universal and monist principles; in Sparta (and much of Peloponnesia, however, more solitary and integral ideas endured). The Spartan oath was sworn 'by the twin gods' (and images of Castor and Pollux were hung amongst the branches of pear trees . . . hence, the 'one' god was thought of as a pair). This 'one' was a composite and integral one . . . but I would emphasize, this pair did not resemble an opposed set; this, the dyadic 'one' resembled the classic model of a city (as an integrity of core and periphery, or hold and hull). Our typical vision of duality is oppositional (rather than compositional), as the image is 'one' of polar extremes seen as a linear continuum; the dyadic or integral pair speaks to an apportionment (in a rational rela-

tionship). Rather than a relativity between two abstracted unitary values, we begin with a composite and singular relationship between portions (that compares the magnitude of one portion with the other, or with the integrity of both). This relationship may also be demonstrated as a line that possesses *both* a length and a breadth. I would speculate that the tension between Unitary and integral visions is also the essential difference between 'The Rose' and 'The Thistle' (with England favoring the former, and Scotland favoring the latter).

What we are referencing here is a system of co-ordinates: a system that resembles our number system (and is characterized by the difference between points and degrees). Lines of latitude are called as they are because they have a magnitude of width or breadth. All lines of longitude are great circles, and pass through the poles: these lines are associated with points (they are long, and possess only a magnitude of length). We assume a monist scheme when we speak of directional points and the four cardinal points; with respect to measures of rotation, there are thirty-two points; there could, however, be sixty-four, one hundred twenty eight, or any compounding total (depending upon the degree of exactitude deemed necessary). In maritime use, thirty-two are sufficient. Points, however, are associated with uniform measures of a *rotational* cycle only. When we measure *revolutions* in uniform measures, we must use degrees. Degrees are not the same as points, *and should not be compounded* (as points may). Because we tend to use degrees when measuring arcs or angles in plane geometry, we also tend to confuse them with points (and divide each degree into minutes and seconds of arc). Our measures of chronological time are rotational, and are appropriate to points; we err, however, when we apply them to geometry and geological measures (as well as in the system of grids that we find so useful in mathematics and navigation). Lines of latitude are very different from lines of longitude.

Longitudinal lines (as the name suggests) are as mathematical lines that lack a character of breadth. Lines of latitude are zonal -- they are 'fat' lines, and are representative of limes and their limits. All lines of longitude are as great circles about the earth: they are as theoretical and mathematical lines of circumference about a circle. Lines of latitude are lines of divergence (or of revolutions turning upon and between two planes separated by a quarter rotation). The climes or climates are numbered as an equatorial or torrid zone, two temperate and two cold or polar extremes. You -- the reader -- may need to 'cut me' some latitude here; latitude 'speaks' to revolving systems, whereas longitude speaks to rotating systems: we have twin schemes of temporal turning or mixing (and a comprehensive *theme* of circulation that is integral and solitary). We find it impossible to reconcile the units of one scheme with those of the other, as the two do not appear evenly divisible. Units are arrhythmic, however integers are musical and beatific (as there is a regulating 'slack' between each beat). Within such thematic systems divergence is essential: not only does it allow for such 'slack,' but the very dynamic, and regulation, of such systems *is dependent upon this 'slack'* (and, in a sense, the discretion they provide enables them). Social and cultural systems are also dynamic (follow a simi-

lar pattern) and the very basis of their regulation is largely a function of allowable slack, and a strict interpretation of their laws (wherein there is little or no slack) will serve to perturb the system (and, arguably, to eventually destroy its essential dynamic). We begin to suspect that our abstract scheme (and all that we think we know as a function of its application) is not as faithfully reflected, as we tend to suppose.

Our notions relative to velocity (and time) are indefinite, indiscreet and instant: although a day is a unit of time, without transitions between the dark portions and the light (as twilight slacks) we are forced to think of a day of twenty-four hours as a Unity . . . and each 'light portion' as a binary unit. Where we read, "and the morning and the evening were the (nth) day" we are referencing a rising and falling in the very same sense that we reference tides (or *periods* of time). We may know what a day is, however we cannot comprehend days, or tides, until we recognize these essential transitions (of slack) that differentiate any one from the next or from the *former;* we fail to see that without discretion (the 'case' of Rhea) all is instant and flowing without distinction . . . and render our units of time irrational with reference to our units of tidings.

All of this, as well as any discussion of formal strictures and informal privileges, requires a 'bewareness' of integral **and** universal relationships (and the difference between a bit and a piece). Without this, we fail to comprehend that the feminine 'case' of Rhea or the masculine 'case' of Chronos are not opposed and potentially in conflict . . . in gender and in physics, comprehensive dynamism is based upon a mutual dependency that is thematic. If I have a 'problem' with Universalism, it is based in the exclusivity of Unitarian assumptions . . . and in the emergence of dualism . . . of notions related to conflicting opposites. If an integral day is composed of a light portion and a dark, with two indistinct transitions, how might we come to view one portion in isolation from (or worse, in conflict with) the other? Or, for that matter, why do we insist upon viewing an underworld in conflict with an opposed surface world (as the realm is as interdependent as are the genders of dynamic, as well as the schemes of Castor and Pollux)? There is, however, one set of opposites that do not complement each other (a set that is neither dynamic nor perspective): the opposed and conflicting set I speak of is that of cosmos and chaos. We are in need of a point of departure (of a *status quo* anti and and pro).

All that is circumstantial (all that surrounds each of us) may only be known phenomen-ologically . . . that is, as phenomena (and seen, mentally or actually, as and through visions). This that follows is necessarily speculative (to a greater degree, even, than what has preceded). It is speculative in the very same sense that all investments are (and what we invest is capital and cardinal). Before the beginning there was but Chaos and Cosmos: two opposed and extreme states. This is our point of departure, as both are prior to the establishment of our creative and accretive series of generation. The capital and base are (like money) monist and directly interchangeable. The specter is one of an extremely rapid alternation between two states: one of which is characterized by a static and absolute rectitude; the other

by a contrasting and absolute state of fluidity, wherein all is in flux and amorphous. Here I would remind readers that, whilst science seeks understanding through knowledge, history (along with the other muses) seeks comprehension . . . and, toward that end, history does not seek to explain (but rather, to make past and present comprehensible). Where I speak of 'the cod of the code,' I reference an act of investment. As with what has been said on the topic of quantification, capital is thought of as the transcendent threshold between generations (or, numerically, as the tenth unit in base ten).

A decapitated column has no capital; you might think of such a column as a stack of coins with square holes at their centers. Stone quoits, coins or disks are (or where) stabilized in stacks by a square timber core passed through these holes. These columns were based upon pedestals (feet), and capped with capitals (heads). It is the quantity of 'coins' or quoits between foot and head that determined the base: in base ten, we have nine coins in each upright column. The heads or capitals of these columns were independent, in that they were not affixed to the central support (and had no square hole). They served to both support, and to join, a lower story to an upper story. As in the architecture of many ancient civilizations, much of the design of important civil and religious buildings was a reflection of, and application of, the very code that enabled the productive and accretive capacity of all cities: I suggest that this has much to do with quantification. The 'hat' or cap of each column did not complete a generation; rather, it started the next.

As a student in elementary school, you may recall being taught about 'families' of numbers: the family of units, of tens, of hundreds, and of thousands, *et cetra*. You may not recall that the family of tens starts with ten (and that of units finishes with nine). These units are as the 'coins' of our stacked columns. The 'family' of the second story is also that of each column's capital. In other words, the transcendence is between the ninth disk or coin and the capital. A facade is supported by numerous columns; each of which is distanced from those adjacent. You may start to see that each coin possesses a placement within a net or grid: each is identifiable with regard to its file and its rank. You are less likely to observe that the total distance between the supporting columns is not the same as the magnitude that spans them from one end to the other. The expanse -- every expanse -- neglects the stance of all upright and supporting members. What we measure *in units* is called *departure* . . . and we do the very same when we measure the extent of a voyage, a journey, and even the distance *between* celestial bodies. We do not count the columns (or the stance of any body), and neither do we count that with which we invest ourselves in (or wrap about our selves, or the shells that insulate every pea in a pod or cod). The question that arises in my mind is whether a unit in the 'tens family' is the same as a unit in the family of units. I think not.

Ancient Hebrews employed foreign engineers in the building of Salomon's Temple; Hebrew architects designed the temple, however (I would wager) that they foresaw the dangers associated with the schematic skills (and thought) of builders and engineers. Not only were those skills and crafts attractive (and in great demand), they

were also exclusive and seductive). Salomon (and the Hebrews) clung to their traditions. Bear in mind, the code is creative, productive, civil and enabling; it is also inevitably consumptive. Being someone who is not fond of opposed notions, it is not for me to say whether these Hebrew architects were more righteous than the Phoenician engineers they hired. I do not care for the words righteous and 'evil' . . . what I would suggest is that carpenters and other technical engineers or builders tend to know more and comprehend less. They, and their exclusively unitary and pragmatic thinking tend to prevail over more traditional and comprehensive people and cultures (and there is no suggestion that this is 'good' or 'bad'). What it serves to accomplish, however, is to speed up the approach of a consumptive climax. Now, that is a powerful word (climax).

Not surprisingly, the word is rooted in the sense of a ladder (of climbing a ladder, to ever higher degrees of altitude). Although I balk at regarding the citizens of ancient Babylon evil, the myth of Babel ends in such a compact and powerful climax . . . if not climbing a ladder, they sought to build and climb a tower. The name of the city signifies something like 'heaven's gate' . . . and (according to myth) the purpose or intent was to provide access. Also according to the myth, the punishment (of babbling tongues) served to address presumptuous arrogance of the first degree (and a complete lack of humility). That, I submit, would be how the Hebrew traditionalists would have viewed their Phoenician engineers. Perhaps the pyramid builders of Egypt and Middle-America entertained a similar intent.

The Mayan civilization did not build pyramids, and (in one respect, at least) might be thought similar to our Hebrew architects: they possessed what anthropologists have called a universal unit. I respectfully suggest that this measure was neither a unit nor universal (and that it very closely resembled a cubit). To some, and very likely many, modern writers the ancient valuation of pi appears naive at best. Probably the best (and most cited) example is found in 2 Chronicles (4-2): the molten sea. The late Carl Sagen observed that, having given the diameter of the vat (ten cubits), there should have been no need to also give the length of the line 'round about' (given as thirty cubits). Since the circumference would appear to be 'short' by nearly one and a half units of measure, he quipped to the effect that Hebrew mathematicians had little regard for 'troublesome' fractions. This somewhat patronizing appraisal relates to the Biblical valuation of pi as three.

The seemingly overgenerous description of temple furnishings was purposeful (and so was the vat of molten lead): the vat served as a standard by which to maintain an accurate cubit length and breadth. The 'sea' was molten so as to maintain a constant temperature, and distance 'from brim to brim.' A cubit, as well as Mayan 'universal units,' was a composite measure (was <u>not a unit</u>). The line of circumference ('roundabout') possessed a magnitude of breadth (a hands-breadth). The reason the Mayan equivalent is mistakenly called 'universal' is because it shares an important characteristic with cubits: *there is no need for 'square' or round measures of area, or cubic measures of volume*. This is thematic: *is not a scheme of multiple dimensions*. In the compositional theme multiple dimensions do not exist.



The breadth of the 'brim' is a hands-breadth, and the span from brim to brim (ten cubits) is less than what would be the diameter of this ring if the circumference were a hairline. The relative thickness of a circumscribed line effects both the area it enclosures or encompasses and the area it possesses.



The ratio between the length of a diameter and that of the circle it bisects changes as the width of 'brim' widens or narrows.

Where the span from brim to brim is ten cubits, the extent of the line that compasses roundabout is thirty cubits (that is, **the 'sea'** was ten cubits across, and the depth *thereof* was five cubits). The form of the contained sea if cooled and cast would be as a hemisphere, and that of the containing vessel (the vat) was as a bowl. There was, however, one great difficulty: whereas a unit remains constant from generation to generation, cubits do not. With each creative generational cycle (as the plenitude of things increases exponentially), the 'breadth' of the 'brim' diminishes. Where one aspect of proportion relates to comparative length of lines (pi), the other (phi) relates to the relative magnitude of that which is contained *and of that which serves to contain*. Our vat (as well as the Grail) is navicular and integral. Through all temporal generations the velocity of change -- and of the rate at which our insulating periphery shrinks -- increases exponentially. Here is the supreme irony: as the theoretical and universal scheme comes to better reflect the reality it apprehends, our technological capacity also expands exponentially (along with its pragmatic application and apparently unlimited potential), until the theoretical abstraction replicates the reality. This, the exhaustion of the peripheral bounds, is the basis for what we call apocalyptic prophecies. They tend to focus upon the breaking of seals (that keep us enveloped, and that envelop us as we are divested of all our investments). This would tend to terrify and sadden those of us who cannot comprehend . . . and this is also why I have persevered as I have (in these efforts that attempt to enable perspective and composite comprehension).

****

My 'problem' with two-fold visions is is that they are bipolar: optimism is indicative of a positive and optimal extreme, whereas pessimism expresses the opposite polar extreme. So much of what we think and read is visual and optical: we view and interpret phenomena, and our mental imaging and imagining is optimized phenomenologically. What our eyes see is highly selective, and so also are the visions of our minds . . . what we 'see' is very closely associated with whatever we are looking for. Furthermore, what we physically see (with our own eyes) can be trumped by whatever our mind's eye desires to see (and the same is true of what we audibly hear). Even with respect to our interpretation of the information we process, there would appear to be an hierarchy related to our reading: what we image or imagine is not always optimized (as through mental 'lenses'), and our 'reads' of circumstantial evidence are influenced by the relative strength of our feelings. Our feelings or emotions are fluid, constantly changing, and often alternating . . . there is always an alternative vision or phantasm, however one mode (and one 'eye' always dominates the alternate). Further, this is not simply a matter of left or right (but also of a cognitive mind or a pensive, and evaluative, brain). The question of which is dominant is a function of generative cycles, as well as of gender (that is, of insight or outlook).

In mathematics, logic, music, language and in poetry there is always a beatific 'play' between an aspect that leads (as the top of a beat) and one that follows in sequence (as the completing and competing bottom of that same beat). Somehow, it is the rising aspect that is thought dominant (and, with respect to gender, thought the leader); what we universally tend to forget is that each beat is integral, and fully dependent upon both of its aspects. As with the beat of a day, we tend to see the rising aspect as that which is dominant (and the evening as recessive), and so it is with odd and even numbers. What is thought beatific (and, parenthetically, as beautiful as Beatrix) is the composite integrity of each beat. In verse (poetry) every beat or foot has an arsis and a thesis; in logic, however, we take the thesis, try it by turning it back upon itself (as antithesis), and seek to attempt to unify the two in a synthesis that leaves us with a synthetic solution (that is not beatific, as the beat is now homogenized as a unit that is neither feminine nor masculine. In poetry there is no agreement with regard to which aspect of a beat 'takes precedence' (and is deemed dominant); it is all a matter of placement in a scheme (and thesis, in Greek, refers to placement). An iamb (a metrical foot of two syllables) in English verse places the accented syllable after the unaccented, however in Greek and Latin verse the accented aspect comes first.

As with my earlier observation with regard to philosophical problems, the order of sequential precedence (and consequence, in the context of causes and becauses) is determinant . . . and yet, largely arbitrary. Dominance, the word, suggests that which is relative to God (as domain and dominion): that is, the dominant 'One' . . . meaning the first aspect (or gender), or that which is considered prime and primary. Again: this is a monist and monetary 'one,' thought of as a monad (and not a solitary dyad). If religion is truly beatific, it is the beat and the integrity of each foot that the one and nameless God should be beheld with comprehension. It is not a

question of which syllable to accent or emphasize, however neither is it difficult to envision how the preference for up-beats, mornings, and rising (and odd) tidings came to be favoured over evenings. This habit of separating or fragmenting integers (and debating which aspect came first) is downright ridiculous . . . and so also is a sense of competition between the genders. The morning and the evening WERE the first day . . . each is indivisible and individual (contained and contented). The fragmentation of each beat or each dyad may very well enable a wealth of pragmatic devices, however the cost is more than Cadmean, it is consumptive and utterly self-destructive.

Of all the questions I have asked myself, that which I ask myself most often is, how much is enough? Perhaps the reason I ask this so often is because it seems to come up so frequently; but, I suspect, it is also because my answers are never fully satisfactory. I find myself asking the same question now (as I am writing) . . . how much is sufficient? As a writer trained as an academic, I am tempted to increase the tension and tempo (whilst bringing up my heavy artillery) as this effort is built up to some sort of climax. But no: (this is not my intent). I have already expressed and expended too many words in this effort. I feel the same with regard to what remains of this life of mine. What transpires from this moment is up to the Fates (who, to this juncture, have seen fit to smile upon me).

The relationship between a writer and a reader is not dissimilar to that between a pair of dancing partners: whether leading or following, it is incumbent upon each 'dancer' to make their partner look good. Why? Well, the answer should be obvious: *because* we are partners in dance. Were one of us to 'shine' too brightly, it would but make his or her partner appear less proficient (and diminish our integral *performance*). The most valuable lesson any 'one' of us might learn is the need to avoid hubris (and to retain our individual humility and integrity).

People ask me how it is that, given my precarious condition, I appear (and am) so consistently happy. This is a question that is easy for me to answer. Having experienced so much solitude, I can tell you all that I have never felt alone. Furthermore, I have come to realize that, although I may seek a destination or a destiny, I am also fully prepared to accept that, whatever it is that lies around the bend, the cape, or the corner is potentially the best (or most appropriate) outcome. I do not attempt to engineer my future . . . and nor do I pretend to know what is best for me. I am happy (and content), as long as there is happenstance. As for the beat and its tempo, whilst we be . . . I am pleased to allow my spirit to lead (whilst dancing and playing) and to motivate me upon this floor or this stage). Yes; I do believe the drama is essential . . . and real or not, the 'show' will always go on (or, inevitably, re-open upon another stage). And, as in theatrics, there is always a gathering of characters at the finale (and, should the performance be applauded, maybe even an encore)!

THANK YOU . . . AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE ALL IN THE SAME BOAT